Recent discussions about World Bank reforms highlight the widely expected increase in commitments by multilateral development banks to address systemic global issues such as climate change. Greater ambition is urgently needed to increase investment to avoid global temperatures increasing by more than 1.5°C and to fund adaptation to the impacts already locked in. Annual climate finance flows are nowhere near the trillions required globally every year, putting developing countries in particular at increasing risk.

The countries that act as shareholders in the multilateral development banks and other development finance institutions, and the recipients of development finance, have legitimate questions to ask about the ambition and speed of action by these institutions. In this context, it helps to understand the trade-offs these organizations face in their decision-making at a deal level.

When structuring and executing a private sector investment, development finance institutions have to make trade-offs that may slow them down but are fundamental to the day-to-day work of investment officers.  While development finance institutions look to achieve meaningful development impact and additionality, they must also account for credit risk and relevance to clients.

Stimulating sustainable economic growth, aligned with developing countries’ stated development objectives or the Sustainable Development Goals, is the core purpose of development finance. 

Development finance institutions strive to achieve ‘additionality’ – meaning that finance goes beyond what would already be available otherwise and does not ‘crowd out’, i.e. displace, the private sector. Additionality can be financial or non-financial in nature, as outlined in a guiding framework published by several multilateral development banks.

Annual climate finance flows are nowhere near the trillions required globally every year, putting developing countries in particular at increasing risk.

Alongside impact and additionality, credit risk is also important. Clients or projects that have high development impact and additionality may not always have the best credit. For example, a large renewable energy project in a least developed country may have strong development impact and additionality but higher credit risk due to a weak credit rating of the off-taker (the power purchaser) and generally higher country risk. 

A comparable project in a middle-income country may have a weaker incremental development impact and additionality but a stronger credit profile. Neither project is inherently better or worse: rather, they involve trade-offs between development impact, additionality and credit risk. 

In addition, it is in middle income countries that development finance institutions are often able to make investments with higher technology risk and demonstration impact, such as the first fully electric ferries or the first project to integrate wind power and energy storage.  

 Credit risk is a key constraint when considering how development finance institutions can best maximize development impact. Any lending institution will have to assume some degree of credit risk. Development finance institutions are still investors, and their mandates compel them to expect a return on their capital, most commonly in the form of interest paid on loans, or through a return on equity investments. 

In the case of interest on loans, this compensates development finance institutions for the opportunity cost of lending, and the risk that a borrower may not repay, and also helps to cover operating costs and limit the need to call on additional public resources.

Weighing up the credit risk against the expected return requires analysis of the creditworthiness of the client. Development finance institutions need to assess what an acceptable level of credit risk is for a given return, simultaneously considering the potential development impacts a project might achieve. 

Importantly, for development finance institution investments to have a lasting development impact, the long-term commercial success of a project or company is essential. An investment with high credit risk also faces a high risk of failing to meet its stated development objectives.

What constitutes an adequate risk-adjusted return is subjective and ultimately up to the development finance institution’s shareholders. Development finance institutions will typically charge interest margins that consider market benchmarks and internal hurdle rates. 

If the risk-adjusted return is inadequate, even if the development impact is very strong, the financing may be difficult to justify based on a development finance institution’s risk appetite. Such projects may even be suited to philanthropy, grants or other forms of non-repayable funding.

Prudent policies on risk-adjusted returns are important because many development finance institutions, particularly multilateral development banks, raise funding on bond markets, subjecting them to rating constraints. The credit rating that development finance institutions receive from the major rating agencies (Fitch, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s) has a direct impact on their borrowing costs. 

A lower credit rating implies higher risk, compelling bond investors to demand a higher return, resulting in more expensive lending costs for development projects. Credit risk considerations will inevitably remain relevant to development finance institutions. No development finance institution will last long if it continually loses money by optimizing solely for development impact while disregarding risk. 

The need to address climate change and promote equitable development is critical for development finance institutions.

Even if a development finance institution identifies an investment opportunity with strong development potential, additionality and an acceptable risk-adjusted return, there is no deal unless the potential client wants to work with the development finance institution. 

This is not a given, as development finance institutions typically promote stringent standards for legal documentation, due diligence, environmental and social safeguards and gender impacts that commercial investors may not require to the same degree.

As a result, there is a cost to working with development finance institutions that clients must weigh up against the perceived financial and non-financial benefits. A development finance institution may find that an investment opportunity that has additionality and impact is highly attractive, but the client may not be sufficiently motivated to adhere to the high standards that the development finance institution requires.

 To maximize the development impact and additionality of projects, development finance institutions must overcome credit risk constraints while staying relevant to potential clients. Development finance institutions also need to take care that the risks they take are ambitious enough to widen the range and change the nature of the projects they finance, ensuring what they provide is truly additional, and not a replication of something that could come from a commercial bank. 

The need to address climate change and promote equitable development is critical for development finance institutions. The trade-offs they face at the deal level in the private sector need to be better understood when discussing whether development finance institutions are doing enough and at the required speed.

They should be considered in the high-level policy debates concerned with reforms of the global system of development finance. The solutions above are just some ways in which these trade-offs could be addressed to the benefit of global development goals.

This article first appeared on the website of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at the London School of Economics and Political Science and benefited from comments and review by Hans Peter Lankes, Daniel Wiedmer and Suzanne Gaboury.